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To a remarkable degree, many writers on irrigation ignore and even appear 
unaware of the relationships between people and irrigation water. Attention is 
usually fixed on hydrological, engineering, agricultural, and economic as-
pects. Especially in official documents it is rare to find described, let alone 
analyzed, the human side of the organization and operation of irrigation 
systems—the management of those who manage the water, the procedures for 
irrigation control, the processes of allocation of water to groups or individu-
áis, the distribution of water within groups. There may be almost as many 
instances of these omissions as there are reports on irrigation. 
Thus the report of the working group for the formulation of the Indian 
Fourth Five-Year Plan proposals on soil and water management under irri-
gated conditions (ICAR, 1966) is entirely technically oriented, has no place for 
any social scientist on any research station, and proposes no research on 
organizational aspects of irrigation or on the management of the staff who 
manage the water. A report of an irrigation program review in Sri Lanka (part 
of an IBRD/FAO cooperative program: MPEA, 1968) is overwhelmingly oriented 
toward capital works and their planning and execution, and while recommend-
ing that there should be many more extensión staff and stating the need for 
coordination at the field level, does not go into any detail about the procedures 
for achieving this. This was despite the terms of reference which included 
instructions to review and recommend institutional, organizational, manage-
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rial, and technical measures to ensure successful execution and operation of 
existing and future projects (my italics). Ñor were the operational and organi-
zational aspects of water management and their economic and social implica-
tions a concern of an international seminar on economic and social aspects of 
agricultura! development in irrigated areas, held in Berlin in 1967 (Germán 
Foundation for Developing Countries, 1967). Finally, a recent publication of 
the National Commission on Agriculture in India dealing with modernizing 
irrigation systems and integrated development of commanded areas shows 
much the same blind spot: it embodies a top-down view of irrigation and omits 
operational detail (Government of India, 1973). 
There are several reasons for this neglect (see also Chambers, 1975a, pp. 
2-6): first, the common preoccupation with capital investment, construction, 
and settlement processes at the cost of the vital operating processes which 
follow; second, cramped visión from within narrow disciplinary boundaries, 
including mutual ignorance between social scientists and technologists and a 
reluctance to explore a no-man's-land between disciplines; third, the intensity 
of research required to examine what happens at the lower levels of adminis-
tration, and difficulties in generalizing from one or a few cases, which are all 
that one researcher may hope to study; fourth, the maddening nature of water 
itself, with its tendency to flow, seep, evapórate, condense, and transpire, and 
the problems it presents in measurement—problems which tie down natural 
and physical scientists to research-intensive tasks, denying them time, even if 
they had inclination, to branch out and examine wider aspects such as the 
people who manage the water and how they behave. 
These tendencies have left several gaps in comparative knowledge. Where 
water is administered to communities, there is a gap geographically between 
the last point at which it is officially controlled or measured and the point at 
which it enters a farmer's field. Organizationally there is a gap between what 
happens at the level of sénior officials and what happens in the community 
which receives the water. Politically there is ignorance of the processes of 
decisión making and allocation which influence the timing and quantity of 
water which farmers receive. In terms of political economy there has been 
little analysis of who gets what, how, when, and why, and with what costs 
and benefits. In terms of human management there is a widespread failure to 
perceive the problems and opportunities of managing those who manage the 
water, the men in organizations and communities. 
This chapter uses the comparison of irrigation systems in the study areas in 
India and Sri Lanka as a basis for some preliminary steps among the 
minefields of interdisciplinary no-man's-land which these gaps represent. 
Much of the evidence is used with misgiving, being based on one-off inter-
views on day visits to villages and cultivation committee areas. For Sri Lanka, 
additional sources have been visits to and studies of the records of two major 
irrigation systems—Gal Oya and Uda Walawe. For India and elsewhere, 
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some secondary sources have also been drawn upon. The purpose is to open 
up some comparative, analytical, and practical aspects of the organization, 
operation, and political economy of irrigation. 
A basic point is that water is usually a scarce resource for which men and 
groups of men compete and the benefits from which should be optimized in 
relation to other scarce resources. In the dry zone of Sri Lanka there is much 
evidence that water is more limiting than Iand (Chambers, 1975a, pp. 19ff.), 
although scarcities of draught power and labour are also constraining (Harriss, 
1976) and may at some times and places be more limiting than water. In parts 
of North Arcot the scarcity of water is even clearer and more acute. Surface 
irrigation water from tanks is often inadequate for a second crop and the 
groundwater level is undergoing a serious secular decline as numbers of wells 
grow, more pump sets are installed, and groundwater extractions increase 
(Madduma Bandara, 1976). As population presses more and more on the 
resources available for food production in these and other environments, so 
understanding the relations between people and water for irrigation becomes a 
more and more vital priority. 
Typologies of Irrigation 
A first step is to try to identify useful categories. The descriptive terms used 
by engineers and agriculturalists domínate discussion of irrigation systems. 
This is partly because they themselves have such key roles in irrigation, partly 
because their categories refer to physically observable phenomena such as 
structures, field layouts, and methods of water application. These categories 
may not be the most useful ones for an analysis of the organization and 
operation of irrigation. But classifying the irrigation systems encountered in 
Sri Lanka and India in terms of their more obvious physical characteristics 
does provide a starting point. 
In the study area in Sri Lanka almost all irrigation is by surface gravity 
flow, most from storage tanks. Tank water is received from various combina-
tions of catchment run-off and river diversión. Scarcely any wells are used for 
irrigation. The commonly used classification of gravity-flow irrigation into 
"ma jo r " and "minor" corresponds with differences in scale and organiza-
tion, not with differences in physical type of source, conveyance, or storage 
of water. The management of water under major irrigation is the responsibility 
of the Territorial Civil Engineering Organization (TCEO), which distributes it 
down to the field channel level. Water management on minor irrigation is the 
responsibility of village communities, which organize their own distribution 
systems. Under a major irrigation project there are usually several cultivation 
committees, whereas under minor irrigation there is usually only one. 
From the more obvious characteristics of scale and type of water source 
and storage, the cultivation committees in our sample can be classified as in 
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Table 2.1. In all cases, distribution from the tank or from the main canal is by 
gravity through channels of diminishing size to farmers' fields. There is only 
one well and pump known under any of these systems (underTissawewa tank) 
and that is not in one of the survey cultivation committee areas. 
In the study area in India there is a greater variety and mixture of irrigation 
systems. The most comrnon form of gravity irrigation consists of canals from 
anicuts from rivers which are dry for most of the year, and which supply 
chains of village tanks in series. In our sample, large tanks are represented 
only by Dusi, which is one of 18 villages served by the large Dusi-Mamandur 
tank. In addition, in all villages there are wells used for lift irrigation. Three 
forms of lift are used—etram (human power), kavalai (ox power), and pump 
sets (oil or, much more commonly, electric power). These wells are usually 
found both on the dry land (land which is not under command for tank or 
channel irrigation) ar.d on the wet land (under command for tank or channel 
irrigation). The villages in the sample can be classified as in Table 2.2. 
The categories in the table follow the necessary but well-worn discipline-
bound criteria of engineers and hydrologists. They are much concerned with 
the acquisition, transport, and storage of water and less with its distribution. 
An engineer talks and thinks in terms of diversión channel, tank, dam, 
gravity, well, pump, major and minor irrigation, with type of structure and 
scale of operation as his main criteria. A hydrologist thinks and talks in terms 
of water cycles and sources of water—shallow or deep well, spring, surface 
run-off storage, and river diversión irrigation, for example. But other disci-
Table 2.1. 
Water source and storage categories 
Cultivation Minor/ Storage 
committee Major Water source system 
Kachchigala Minor Small catchment run-off Small tanks 
Metigatwala Minor Small catchment run-off (now supplemented 
by major irrigation) 
Small tanks 
Kataragama Minor Small catchment run-off Small tank 
Tenagama Minor Small catchment run-off and spills of higher 
tanks with small area sometimes supple-
mented by major irrigation 
Small tanks in 
series, cióse 
together 
Wellawaya Minor Anicut and channel from permanent stream Nil 
Hanganwagura 1 Major 
(WRB) 
Anicut and long channel from Walawe river with Nil 
Jansagama > 
Rotawala f 
perennial flow 
Jayawickremayaya Major Anicut and channel to tank from Kirindi river Tank 
(KOLB) (water not always available) (Debarawewa) 
Kachcherigama Major Anicut and channel to tank (rom Kirindi river Tank 
(KOLB) (water not always available) (Tissawewa) 
Udasgama Major Anicut and channel to tank from Kirindi river Tank 
(KOLB) (water not always available) (Tissawewa) 
Companniwatta Major Anicut and channel to tank from Kirindi river Tank 
(KORB) (water not always available) (Wirawila) 
WRB = Walawe right bank; KOLB = Kirindi Oya left bank; KORB = Kirindi Oya right bank. 
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Table 2.2. 
Village classification 
Tank Wells in Wells in 
Village Non-well water source storage wet land dry land 
Kalpattu Nil Nil No wet land Yes 
Vegamangalam Excavated springs near river, Nil Nil Yes 
permanent flow 
Dusi Channels leading from large seasonal Large Negligible Few 
rivers tank 
Meppathurai, Channel leading from seasonal large Village Yes Yes 
Vinayagapuram river direct to village tank tank 
Amudur, Duli, Combinatlons of natural drainage Village Yes Yes 
Randam, lines and channels from seasonal tank 
Sirungathur, rivers leading through chains of 
Vayalur, tanks to village tank 
Veerasambanur, 
Vengodu 
Note: Some villages have additional small tanks which are fed by catchment run-off. All tanks 
receive some water from their catchments in addition to amounts received from the source named. 
plines would classify irrigation systems quite differently: for an agriculturalist 
the field application of water is central and includes flood, border strip, check 
basin, furrow, underground, and sprinkler irrigation. In the social sciences the 
only large-scale attempt at comparative analysis of the organization and opera-
tion of irrigation has apparently been Wittfogel 's eccentric polemic on oriental 
despotism (1957), although a recent start in classification has been made by 
Thornton (1976). After considering the physical acquisition and transpon of 
water, Thornton points out that it is with distribution that "the largest number 
of organizational alternatives occur ." Distribution is also a potential focus for 
classification since it corresponds with much of the unexplored no-man's-land 
in irrigation. 
Categories depend both on the subject matter and on the orientation of 
the observer. Classifications of irrigation organization can themselves be 
classified as top down, bottom up, or middle outward, depending on the focus 
of concern and the stance of the typologist. Thornton's types derive from a 
top-down view, using formal organization and the distribution of respon-
sibilities within the organization to separate out categories, with a major 
división into prívate and public organizations. A bottom-up view of irrigation, 
starting with the farmer and his preoccupations, might differentiate between 
irrigation systems according to the cost, adequacy, convenience, and reliabil-
ity of the supply of irrigation water to the farm. A middle-outward view of 
irrigation organization would start geographically and organizationally in the 
middle of the distribution system. It might differentiate systems according to 
the decisions, communication, and allocations which affect distribution, look-
ing both upward toward the source from which the water derives and down-
ward to the farmer. All three views—top down, bottom up, and middle 
outward—deserve to be developed. Here we will start in the relatively unex-
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plored middle ground and move outward from there, paying particular atten-
tion to the organization and operation of communities and bureaucracies in the 
distribution of water. 
A central and universal issue in the distribution of irrigation water is who 
gets what, when, and where. This is the very stuff of politics and it is 
surprising that political scientists, political aríthropologists, and those who 
study political economy have not devoted more attention to it. Where water is 
scarce and often constraining and when individual farmers and communities 
of farmers compete for it, the focus is on the processes of allocation and 
acquisition which determine the access of users to water. These processes can 
be classified as: 
The user acquires water directly from a 
natural source such as a prívate dam or 
well. 
The user acquires water through agreement 
with a supplier in exchange for goods or 
services. 
A communal source of water is allocated 
among a community of users. 
Water is allocated by bureaucratic organiza-
tion direct to individual users. 
Water is allocated by a bureaucratic or-
ganization to one or more communities 
of users, each of which manages distribu-
tion to its members. 
These types are represented in the examples available as in Table 2.3. The 
categories adopted must be treated warily. They are designed for convenience 
Direct appropriation 
Acquisition through 
contract 
Community allocation 
Bureaucratic allocation 
Bureaucratic-communal 
allocation 
Table 2.3. 
Water allocation 
Type of 
allocation/ 
acquisition Sri Lanka India 
Direct 
Contract 
Community 
Bureaucratic 
Bureaucratic-
communal 
Negligible 
Negligible (except where tenancy 
carries water rights) 
All minor irrigation (Kataragama, 
Wellawaya, Tenagama, Metigatwala, 
Kachchigala) 
Uda Walawe 
All major irrigation (Hanganwagura, 
Jansagama, Rotawala, 
Jayawickremayaya, Kachcherigama, 
Udasgama, Companniwatta) 
Very common (individual wells) 
Negligible (except where tenancy 
carries water rights) 
Amudur, Duli, Meppathurai, Randam, 
Sirungathur, Vayalur, 
Veerasambanur, Vegamangalam, 
Vengodu, Vinayagapuram 
Nil 
Dusi 
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without necessarily implying that they have great explanatory power. As with 
many other distinctions in the social sciences, the edges blur and overlap in 
practice. Thus Dusi is immediately a bad fit in bureaucratic-communal irriga-
tion, since the size of the paddy tracts under the large Dusi-Mamandur tank 
would lead anyone familiar with irrigation in Sri Lanka to look for a bureauc-
racy which distributes the water; but in the strict sense of bureaucracy—an 
organization with its own norms, roles, terms of service, and so on—there is 
none. The PWD only controls issues from the tank sluices, leaving the rest to 
the traditional officers of the villages. Again, Amudur, though having a 
community system of allocation and acquisition, has something verging on its 
own "bureaucracy" in the form of three Harijan thoddis who distribute the 
water to individual farmers. These two examples are cited not to undermine 
the classification, but to discourage any tendency to think that words refer to 
classes of entities which are more consistent and distinct than they really are. 
Analysis will concéntrate on those types of which there are numerous 
examples: direct acquisition, almost entirely through wells in India; commu-
nity allocation, widely represented in both Sri Lanka and India; and 
bureaucratic-communal allocation, mainly in Sri Lanka. The focus will be 
further narrowed by concentrating on the levels at which decisions and actions 
affecting allocation and acquisition are taken; for these three irrigation types 
they are as shown in Table 2.4. 
The main attention will be at the community and system levels. "Com-
munity" here refers to users with an interest in a common source of supply, 
the water from which is distributed among themselves. This usually refers to 
what in Sri Lanka is called minor irrigation, to what in India is village tank 
irrigation, and in both countries to groups of users on larger irrigation projects 
who depend upon the same feeder. "Systems" refers to whatever organiza-
tion or arrangement exists above the community level for the management and 
allocation of water. 
The discussion which follows is in two sections: the first deals with the 
organization and operation of community irrigation, examining allocation and 
appropriation of water, equity and productivity, enforcement and arbitration, 
and action by irrigation communities; the second deals with the organization 
and operation of bureaucratic-communal irrigation. 
Table 2.4. 
Levels of decisions actions 
Farmer level Community level System level 
(within (within (within irrigation 
fields) community area) system area) 
Direct Yes No No 
Community Yes Yes No 
Bureaucratic-communal Yes Yes Yes 
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Community Organization and Operation 
The Allocation and Appropriation of Water 
The allocation and appropriation of water can be described in terms of two 
stages: decisions about areas to be irrigated and about timing; and actual 
allocations and appropriations. 
In the first stage a decisión may have to be taken as to which areas under 
command to irrígate. Leach has described for Pul Eliya in Ceylon the nice 
decisión which has to be taken with a village tank: 
The issue is a subtle problem of economic choice since, if the water resources of 
the irrigation system are overextended, the outcome may be total crop failure. 
The village meeting makes its collective decisión on the basis of the level of 
water in the tank and a gambling estímate of rain in the weeks to come. [Leach, 
1961, p. 53; Chapter 5 below, pp. 103-4] 
This type of decisión is not limited to village tanks. Wellawaya depends on 
diversión from a small perennial stream which is not always sufficient for all 
of its six blocks of asweddumized land; similar decisions have to be taken 
about which and how many of the blocks to cultívate in Yala. The only Indian 
village in the sample known to have a similar system is Duli, where, when 
water is short, a decisión is taken to allow the same fixed acreage to each 
holder of wet land and to supply water only for that. Under the other Indian 
villages with tanks there appears to be no formal decisión about the acreage to 
be cultivated: the decisión is left to individuáis, who must rely on their own 
judgment of the water likely to be available and their chances of obtaining 
enough of it, through whatever system of allocation and appropriation oper-
ates and subject to the physical layout of the irrigation system and of their 
fields. Where, as in Vegamangalam, there is a perennial supply of water 
adequate for more or less continuous cropping, the question of which land to 
irrígate or not to irrígate does not arise in the same form but depends on the 
timing and phasing of cultivation operations. 
The second stage of decisión is the allocation and appropriation of water 
within an irrigation community, affecting those areas which it has been de-
cided to irrígate. There are at least four forms this can take: 
1. A physical división of waterflows between channels. The karahankota 
described by Leach for Pul Eliya (1961, pp. 160-66 [Chapter 5 below, pp. 
119-22]) is an example. Water was divided by a wooden weir into which 
flat-bottomed grooves of various widths had been cut, the water allocations 
being the amounts of water which flowed through different grooves into 
different channels. The physical system (though not the proportional alloca-
tions) had fallen into disuse in Pul Eliya even in 1954 and no case of any 
similar system was found in our survey either in Sri Lanka or in India. 
2. Rotational rationing on a roster basis. This is widespread throughout 
36 Robert Chambers 
the world. The warabandi system in Haryana (Vander Velde, 1971, p. 132) 
and the waqt (sunrise to sunset or sunset to sunrise) system in Iraq (Fernea, 
1970, pp. 124-25) are examples. In our survey we found that time had been 
estimated in various ways in the past including judging by the sun during the 
day and by the stars at night, measuring the lengthening shadow of a stick 
either in finger breadths or paces (Amudur), and taking the time a leaking pot 
took to empty (the murai palla system in Vengodu). These methods have, 
however, fallen into disuse and have been replaced by the wristwatch, some-
times in Sri Lanka combined with paper chits (tundu) as in Wellawaya and 
Companniwatta (where four-hour spells have been used in periods of scarc-
ity). In several Indian villages in the sample there was a karai system in 
which a sequence of turns was taken by family groups, the duration of the 
turns being a matter of tradition. But given the dispersal of family lands and 
the complication of pump sets, what happens in practice must be an open 
question. A principie often stated, however, was that the duration of water 
was related to the acreage owned or to the acreage actually cultivated in the 
season in question. 
3. Allocation by restricted acreage. The rationing system at Duli is based 
on the principie that each cultivator should restrict his acreage to a fixed 
amount and then, in rotation, be supplied with the water needed. This has 
some similarities with the bethma system in some purana villages in Sri Lanka 
(Farmer, 1957; Leach, 1961) in which, in a season when acreage had to be 
restricted, all holders of wet land were able to cultívate a portion of the 
irrigated field. 
4. "Anarchy." Water may be not so much allocated as appropriated, as 
described by John Harriss for part of Kirindi Oya right bank: "I have found 
. . . the suggestion of a kind of anarchy in which in time of scarcity water 
supplies depend upon the strength of a man's right a rm" (1976, p. 16). The 
apparent disintegration of traditional allocation systems under Indian village 
tanks may also sometimes verge on this situation. 
Equity and Productivity 
These two sets of actions—deciding the location and timing of irrigation, 
and then the allocation and appropriation of water to those lands which are 
being cultivated—raise acute questions of equity. Rural inequity is often 
associated with differing sizes of landholdings. But this misleads when a man 
with a secure water supply is able to crop his land three times a year while a 
man who has to rely on only one irrigation takes but one crop. The physical 
position of fields relative to channels is critical. Those near the top of channels 
have an immense physical advantage of access which it can be very difficult 
for those farther down to control. In the absence of countervailing custom, 
social sanction, or physical forcé, the privileged top-enders satisfy their own 
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needs first before allowing water to flow on down a channel to their less 
fortúnate neighbors below. The tail-enders often receive less water less reli-
ably and in a less timely fashion than those near the top. There is a striking 
variation in the extent to which the communities studied in India and Sri 
Lanka moderate these inequities and in the methods they use. 
In India the most common systems for distribution under tanks favor those 
at the top end. In Meppathurai, Randam, Sirungathur, Vayalur, and Vee-
rasambanur, top-enders are said to take water first. Moreover, the karai sys-
tem, and any other system of time rationing, is liable to deliver less water to 
tail-enders because of seepage and evaporation losses en route (see Vander 
Velde, 1971, pcissim). However, informants from Vinayagapuram, Amudur, 
and Vengodu all claimed to have systems which made special provisión for 
tail-enders in time of water scarcity: in Vinayagapuram, the first issue was 
said to be from the top downward with the second issue in reverse from the tail 
end upward back toward the top; in Amudur since about 1955 it was said that 
water had been issued to tail-enders first (this was part of a major reform in 
which the supervisión of water allocation was also changed); and in Vengodu, 
where tail-enders had been suffering, a partially effective convention was said 
to discourage those with pump sets in the wet land from using tank water so 
that it could be supplied to those less fortúnate cultivators who did not have 
pump sets. It is, however, Duli's system, allowing adequate water to equal 
plots of land, which scores highest for equality. In Sri Lanka the systems also 
varied but information on them is incomplete. On major irrigation, however, 
the practices appeared to follow the principie of "the devil take the 
hindmost." 
Questions of equity are linked with questions of productivity. With food 
production a major objective and water a critically scarce resource, measures 
which might be more equitable have to be weighed also in terms of pro-
ductivity. The main issue is that the conveyance of water involves losses 
through percolation and evaporation. Duli scores highly for equity but the 
water losses in distributing water as in Navarai 1972 to small plots of 0.3 acres 
each scattered over the ayacut must have been substantial. Had it been possi-
ble to adopt an equivalent of the bethma system, in which all cultivators 
participated but in which the water was applied to one block of land near the 
tank, then the productivity of water and the total output of the land should 
have been higher. Similarly the supply of water to tail-enders first is wasteful, 
not only in conveyance losses but also in the Ioss of opportunity to reuse 
drainage water and to raise the water table; for when top-enders in an ayacut 
take water first, seepage in their fields may raise the water table lower down 
and thereby reduce subsequent water duties there, and surface run-off into 
drains may be reused by cultivators nearer the tail end, as at Kataragama and 
under Tissawewa in Sri Lanka. 
The questions are complex and interlinked with the patterns of wealth and 
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powcr in irrigation communities. Any govemment may hesitate to intervene 
in such a difficult policy area; but several of the Indian villages had them-
selves within living memory changed their water allocation systems, in one 
case at least (Amudur) in the direction of greater equity in distribution. The 
systems used are by no means a sacred part of the social fabric, to be tampered 
with only at the risk of severe disruption. The evidence suggests that water 
distribution under tanks was usually both inequitable and inefficient in terms 
of productivity. A particular example is the tendency for those with water 
available from wells and pump sets none the less to take tank water (since they 
do not have to pay for it), denying it to their less fortúnate neighbors who may 
not have wells. The result may often be that a village cultivates a much 
smaller area than it could if the pump-set owners were to use only well water. 
Could those with pump sets be persuaded or forced to forgo tank water? The 
suggestion was greeted with laughter in Randam and Vayalur, but informants 
in Vengodu suggested that some such idea was at large there and might even 
be partially implemented. If, with the introduction of pump sets in wet land 
and the progressive fragmentation and dispersal of family lands, the distribu-
tion systems under tanks in North Arcot are looser and less effective than in 
the past, this may be a time when an official initiative to increase both equity 
and productivity is feasible. Differential taxation to provide an incentive to 
pump-set owners in the wet land to abstain from using tank water might be 
considered. 
Enforcement and Arbitration 
An intriguing set of questions arises over infringements and disputes and 
their adjudication. There is a sharp contrast between Sri Lanka and India. 
John Harriss has described (1976) the work of the vel vidanes who were 
appointed by government under the colonial regime in Sri Lanka, armed with 
authoritarian powers, and remunerated with a share of the crop; and the 
subsequent system of enforcement through the elected administrative sec-
retaries (Govimandala Sewaka) of the cultivation committees, who received 
40 percent of an acreage tax. It seems to be widely accepted that the vel 
vidane system could be quick-acting and technically efficient, whereas the 
cultivation committee system has always been slow-acting and permissive. 
Cultivators canvassed in our survey gave responses which can be interpreted 
as preference for a system, whether vel vidane or other, which was authorita-
tive, quick, and effective (Chambers, 1976b, text and Appendix A). It would 
be easy, if no other system were known, to conclude from this that a more 
authoritative and more efficient system is needed at the irrigation community 
level; that a committee cannot perform this function; and that a man whose 
reward is unrelated to the valué of the crop is unlikely to perform it well. 
The contrast with the Indian villages is then striking. Under the South 
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Indian tanks there is no equivalent of the vel vidane. There is no tradition of a 
government servant being concerned with allocations within the paddy tract 
under small tanks. The system is radically different. Whereas the vel vidane 
was usually an influential and prosperous local person, those responsible for 
the execution of water control in the South Indian villages are Harijans, the 
thoddis or neer thoddis. Their responsibilities vary considerably, as does their 
remuneration. In some villages they are responsible only for closing and 
opening the sluice. In Amudur, however, they have extensive responsibilities 
in executing the allocations in the paddy tract. One of the three Amudur 
thoddis said (1974) that he would never allow anyone else to move water and 
if they did there would be an ur panchayat meeting and the miscreant would be 
fined; but this had never happened. Evidently, if our informants were correct, 
rights and allocations in Amudur are clearly understood and the thoddis have 
clear guidelines to follow. One Amudur farmer went so far as to say that under 
the system practiced before 1955 there were many disputes, but now he did 
not even bother to go to his fields when water was due as he had complete 
trust in the fair operation of the system by the thoddis. 
The extent to which an arbitration role is demanded must depend on the 
extent to which there are infringements or, in the absence of clear rules, the 
extent to which there are acts which cause serious resentment. No doubt 
cultural differences and different developmental experiences profoundly in-
fluence attitudes toward different forms of arbitration. But appeals to outside 
authorities are common. On the basis of a comparison of fifteen irrigation 
systems in the Philippines, Ongkingco has written, "It is striking to note the 
satisfaction of farmers when somebody in authority, like a policeman or a 
major, attends to water distribution problems. Under these circumstances, 
farmers even seem to be satisfied with reduced water supplies" (Ongkingco, 
1973, p. 242). In Sri Lanka, one administrator has lamented the volume of 
cases and appeals presented to him over water matters, deflecting him from 
the main task of stimulating agricultural production (Weerakoon, 1973, p. 7). 
Performing these arbitration functions, whether the arbitrator is a government 
servant or a local person, is not easy. Administrative secretaries interviewed 
in Sri Lanka were generally unenthusiastic about their work, several of them 
complaining about the arduous duties involved. In the Philippines again, 
Ongkingco found one hereditary water master (whose duties were roughly 
similar to those of an administrative secretary) who wanted to relinquish his 
position because he got no benefit from it, but felt he could not do so because 
of community tradition (Ongkingco, 1973, p. 240). 
One objective of government policy may be to improve equality and 
productivity while avoiding involvement in administrative costs. Once gov-
ernment intervenes, there is a danger of an endless series of cases and appeals, 
and of a need to provide more staff to deal with them. There is also a danger of 
inducing attitudes of dependence among communities. To secure a " f a i r " 
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distribution of water within irrigation communities may often be difficult (and 
in any case there are problems with the connotations and interpretations of 
"fa i r") . But cultivators do appear generally to agree that they valué quick 
action. And even where governments cannot institute " fa i rer" distribution of 
water, there may be opportunities for them to enable crucial decisions and 
judgments to be made more promptly. 
Action by Irrigation Communities 
Governments benefit if they can rely on action by irrigation communities 
for the operation and maintenance of irrigation works. The survey villages are 
of interest because they present four cases in India where considerable com-
munal labor is called for to maintain an irrigation system, one of which has 
collapsed; and one case in Sri Lanka of partial collapse. 
The four cases in India all involve work required to acquire and transport a 
communal water supply. They are Dusi, Vegamangalam, Meppathurai, and 
Vinayagapuram. 
The Dusi case involved collaboration between the eighteen villages served 
by the Dusi-Mamandur tank. On 16 August 1971 the Dusi-Mamandur irriga-
tion board, consisting of one representative of each of the villages, a se-
cretary, and a president, met to decide how to secure the flow in the channel 
from the anicut to the tank. This, they maintained, was the responsibility of 
the PWD, but as the PWD could not be relied on to act swifty enough, the 
villages themselves had to take action. They decided that each village should 
send labor at the rate of one man to every ten acres irrigated, in order to divert 
the Palar River into the channel. The work was apparently successful. 
The Vegamangalam case is a continuing and customary activity. When 
the long channel bringing the spring water to the pangu lands of the village 
requires a cleaning out, every family with a share provides labor at the rate of 
one man per anna of land (1.6 acres of wet plus 0.74 acres of dry). The system 
apparently works well. 
The Meppathurai case is an example of a practice abandoned: of what it 
was there were several differing accounts. What was agreed is that the run-off 
flow into the Meppathurai tank had for many years been supplemented by a 
channel from the Cheyyar River. When the river flooded, villagers dug in the 
river and in the channel to divert water into the channel and along it to the 
tank. Much work was involved in removing silt from the channel. In about 
1967 there was a heavy flood and the channel seriously silted up. According 
to some, the task of clearing was too great for the village and appeals for 
government assistance failed. Others state that there were political differences 
between the larger, older farmers (who were Congress supporters and stood to 
benefit more from clearing) and the smaller, younger farmers (who were 
DMK supporters and stood to benefit less). Yet another contributory factor 
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may have been a high degree of absentee ownership of wet land. It is also 
possible that the farmers were not unduly concerned because they could 
anyway rely on their pump sets in the wet land. But whatever the cause, 
Meppathurai failed either to obtain government assistance or to carry out the 
clearing itself. In 1974, some six years later, the situation was even less 
remediable; the two miles of channel were heavily overgrown with bush and 
the poorer people who used it as a source of firewood for sale were opposed to 
any clearing. 
The Vinayagapuram case is an interesting contrast. The main water supply 
for the tank comes from a five-mile channel taking off from the Cheyyar 
River. This requires extensive and heavy work to clear off sand during the 
period from the beginning of January until the end of April. All those cul-
tivators who benefit from the channel have an obligation to clear three feet per 
day for every acre of wet land they hold. The work is closely administered and 
arduous, but the second (Navarai) crop depends on it. There is a long history 
of conflict with Konaiyur, a village which lies astride the channel above 
Vinayagapuram but which has no rights to the water. Twenty years ago, when 
the channel silted very badly and Vinayagapuram was appealing for govern-
ment help to clear it, Konaiyur people said they would clear it and take it over. 
However, Vinayagapuram obtained government assistance and managed to 
continué maintenance. More recently, theft of water by people from Konaiyur 
has led to violence and court cases. When the channel is running, 
Vinayagapuram posts night guards where it runs through Konaiyur. Since the 
main crisis twenty years ago the system of communal labor appears to have 
been continuously effective. 
The final case, from Sri Lanka, raises the issue of the división of mainte-
nance responsibilities between communities and bureaucracy. In one instance, 
a long canal was heavily silted and overgrown. Partly because of this, water 
only reached the tail end four to six weeks after it began to flow at the top. It 
was in the interests of the tail-enders but not of the top-enders that the canal 
should be cleaned and maintained. The maintenance responsibility lay with 
the Territorial Civil Engineering Organization, which was unable to carry it 
out. The TCEO suggested that the communities themselves should clean the 
canal. The tail-enders, in whose interest it was that the canal should be 
cleaned, might have done the work, but by then the top-enders already wanted 
water. The result was no maintenance and continuing inefficiency and in-
equity in water distribution. 
These examples support common-sense conclusions about communal 
labor. First, communal labor is most likely to be effective where the commu-
nity will benefit directly and where labor obligations are proportional to 
expected benefits. Thus Dusi and the other seventeen villages could mobilize 
labor to divert the river into the tank, and Vegamangalam and Vinayagapuram 
maintained their channels. In all these cases the labor obligation was related to 
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irrigated acreage. Conversely, where there is no direct link between the work 
done and the benefits gained, communal maintenance will be much more 
difficult. One of the reasons given for the abandonment of the Meppathurai 
channel was that the young men and small farmers felt that they were being 
required to do more than their share in relation to the benefits they might 
expect. Even more so, it is unrealistic to expect maintenance to be undertaken 
by people who will not benefit at all, as with clearing of silt at the top of 
channels by top-enders, which only helps those farther down. 
A second conclusión concems the role of government. Intervention to help 
a community may be critical in sustaining a system of communal maintenance 
when it is under exceptional stress. Vinayagapuram's system survived after a 
successful appeal for government help; Meppathurai's collapsed after a simi-
lar appeal failed. The judgments involved are nice since too much help too 
easily given generates attitudes of dependence which in turn may lead to 
collapse. One error to avoid is uncertainty about the physical boundaries of 
responsibility for maintenance. Such uncertainty aróse in Sri Lanka following 
an instruction to the TCEO (which was not well received by staff at the local 
level) that they should extend their maintenance work farther down some 
channels. The outcome of such a situation is Hable to be that neither govern-
ment ñor the community maintains the works. In general, government should 
unambiguously avoid doing what communities can do for themselves in their 
own interests, but should intervene when exceptional problems are beyond a 
community's power to overcome. 
A third conclusión is that those who design irrigation systems in countries 
where labor is abundant and government poor should consider designs which 
encourage community action. These require that the maintenance work shall 
be within the capacity of the numbers of cultivators anticipated, and that they 
shall benefit from the work being done. The recurrent costs to government of 
the irrigation system should then be less than if government itself were 
obliged to provide maintenance. Higher capital costs, for example with more 
separate channels to communities which would then maintain them, might be 
justified by reducing the recurrent costs of maintenance by government. 
Bureaucratic-Communal Organization and Operation 
Perhaps the most interesting, important, and difficult questions concern the 
organization and operation of bureaucratic-communal irrigation, in which 
water is controlled first by a bureaucracy and then by a community or com-
munities. The issues which arise within irrigation communities also arise now 
within the bureaucracy, between the bureaucracy and the communities, and 
between communities. The problems of water allocations between compe-
titors, the questions of productivity and equity, and the difficulties over en-
forcement and adjudication which all occur within communities are now 
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replicated but on a bigger, more visible, and sometimes more dangerous scale 
on the larger irrigation system. 
Although the variations are legión, a recurrent concern and source of 
intercommunity conflict on bureaucratic-communal irrigation arises over the 
allocation and appropriation of water. With community irrigation, without a 
bureaucracy, we have already seen how the poáching of Vinayagapuram's 
water by farmers from Konaiyur, higher up the channel, led to violence and 
litigation, with the difference that there is a mediating bureaucracy. Common 
practices include constructing illegal outlets, breaking padlocks, drawing off 
water at night, and bribing, threatening, or otherwise in some way inducing 
officials to issue more water. Typically those at the top end get their water 
first and get most of it, while those at the tail end suffer. Many examples 
could be given. On Kirindi Oya right bank canal in Sri Lanka, there are 
several extra pipes off the main canal which were not part of the original 
irrigation design (personal communication, John Harriss) extracting water 
higher up, often to the detriment of those lower down. In North India the 
tensión between villages may erupt into serious threats to law and order. 
Vander Velde reports an intervillage dispute in which ten cuts were made in 
an embankment in less than twenty-four hours and major violence between 
villages threatened (1971, p. 154). Both in the allocation of water and in the 
execution of the allocations the competition between communities is an ines-
capable problem. 
Í
Productivity and equity are in volved here, as they are in intracommunity 
distribution. Other things being equal, water is less productive after con-
veyance losses to the tail end of a channel than if it can be applied at the top 
end. Moreover, when a canal is long, conveyance losses are high, and delays 
in the arrival of water at the tail end run into weeks or even months, as they do 
with the seventeen miles of the Walawe right bank in Sri Lanka, then planting 
at the tail end becomes untimely, either forcing cultivators to grow lower-
yielding, shorter-duration varieties, or involving them in risks of inadequate 
water at critical periods in the growth of the crop, or condemning the crop to 
climatically suboptimal conditions, or some combination of these. Excessive 
extractions higher up commonly contribute to these delays and inadequacies 
of supply to the tail end. On much major irrigation in Sri Lanka it is notorious 
that top-end farmers flood their fields more than is necessary for the growth of 
paddy and substitute water for labor in weeding, with little or no regard for 
their neighbors waiting dry farther down the channel. Their behavior is ra-
tional, given their interests; but it is also antisocial, both in denying their less 
fortúnate neighbors timely and adequate water and in denying the country the 
additional paddy which their neighbors might be producing. The same is true 
with water issues on the two largest schemes in Sri Lanka—Gal Oya and Uda 
Walawe—where the acreage cultivated is much less than it might be because 
of permissive and excessive water issues. In the one Indian example of 
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bureaucratic-communal irrigation (Dusi-Mamandur) the problem may be less 
acute, but even there tail-enders complained that they could grow fewer crops 
in the year than top-enders. 
The challenge here is to be inventive in devising institutions and relation-
ships which will moderate intercommunity strife and be both equitable and 
productive in the allocation and application of irrigation water. There are four 
clusters of functions to be performed: 
1. Strategic decisions about water use, including timing, amounts, alloca-
tions to communities, which lands to be irrigated, what crops to grow, and the 
maintenance of channels. 
2. The execution of those decisions. 
3. Allocation of water and arbitration within communities. 
4. Policing, and prosecutiort of infringements. 
The question is how officials on the one hand and communities of users or 
their representatives on the other should be combined or separated in order 
best to perform these functions. A problem here is the word "bes t . " The 
criteria for evaluating solutions already include the productivity of water and 
the equity of its distribution. To this some, democrats, would add maximizing 
participation by the users, while others, technocrats, would add its antithesis, 
maximizing the decisión making and control by tehnical staff. 
In deciding the balance to strike between the democratic and technocratic 
views it is chastening to reflect on the side differences which can be observed. 
At one extreme is the system operated under the Dusi-Mamandur tank in 
India, with its ayacut supporting eighteen villages. Intercommunity water 
allocation decisions are made by the president of the irrigation board elected 
by the villages. Villages send their traditional functionaries to him with re-
quests for water which he then forwards, after whatever amendment he judges 
necessary, to the section officer of the PWD, who instructs one of his staff to 
open or cióse the sluice from the dam accordingly. In Sri Lanka, on this size 
of irrigation system, the distribution from the channels below the tank would 
be the responsibility of government staff, but according to the evidence given, 
all water movement below the Dusi-Mamandur tank is the responsibility of an 
irrigation board of village representatives. Among the examples available, 
this is an extreme versión of user participation in strategic decisions and their 
execution. At the other extreme are projects where the bureaucracy controls 
water issues right down to the level of the farmer (as on Uda Walawe in Sri 
Lanka) or even to his individual field (as on the Mwea irrigation settlement in 
Kenya [Chambers and Moris, 1973]). 
Both extremes have disadvantages. The Dusi-Mamandur system is proba-
bly inefficient in water use: certainly there is an irrigation engineering opinion 
that water use would be much less wasteful if the bureaucracy controlled 
water issues from the main canals to the irrigation communities; certainly too, 
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the tail-enders only manage one or at best two crops a year while those at the 
top end regularly have two or even three. With tighter management the distri-
bution of water might be both more productive and more equitable. On the 
other hand, the bureaucratic extreme, as on the Mwea irrgation settlement, is 
expensive in government staff and in the associated loss of community self-
management and communal labor for maintenance. Government is liable to be 
doing for communities what they could and would otherwise do for them-
selves. Some middle course between these two extremes may combine greater 
productivity and equity without forgoing communal labor and without the 
need to maintain a large bureaucracy. 
Taking this point of view, we can examine the four clusters of functions 
and see how they might be allocated. 
First, there is a good case for strategic decisions being taken jointly by 
representatives of users and by government officials. Where representatives of 
users take decisions alone, they are likely to lack some of the technicai 
knowledge needed, as probably on Dusi-Mamandur. Where administrators or 
technocrats take decisions on their own they are liable to ignore some needs of 
users, leading to later difficulties. Moreover, as the assistant government 
agent Hambantota wrote in 1922, "The proprietors are more likely to adhere 
to dates which they have agreed to than to regulations imposed from without" 
(letter to Government Agent, Southern Province, 8 November 1922; Hamban-
tota Kachcheri file E85). Better decisions are likely where they result from 
discussion which benefits from an engineer's knowledge of water availability, 
an agriculturalist's appreciation of the cropping position, farmers' knowledge 
of their resources and problems, and a presiding administrator's appreciation 
of all of these. This is very much the system practiced in water meetings in Sri 
Lanka, presided over by government agents. In that form it has both strength 
and weakness in the openness of the meeting to all farmers affected and who 
may or may not fairly represent all the interests involved. Given the large 
attendances, it is not surprising that they decide on dates for operations (such 
as opening the sluices from a tank, starting cultivation, and completing water 
issues) but do not decide the detail of rotational issues. Were there a more 
representative but smallerbody, elected by "irrigation constituencies" which 
would ensure that tail-enders were included, then it might be possible for such 
meetings or a succession of them to decide in more detail what system of 
water issues to communities, with what volumes of water, should be adopted. 
Second, with the execution of these decisions the question is how far the 
bureaucracy should extend down the irrigation system. On Dusi-Mamandur it 
is restricted to the sluice itself. On major irrigation in the dry zone of Sri 
Lanka it extends down the main channels to the points at which water is issued 
into field channels to communities. Communities are unlikely to agree among 
themselves that those higher up will take less in order that those lower down 
may benefit. More usually, an independent and impartial organization is 
46 Robert Chambers 
needed and this is mostly some form of bureaucracy. The need of such 
bureaucracy is underlined by the experience of the elected Thannimurrippu 
Paripalana Sabai, reported by Ellman and Ratnaweera, who state that while 
strategic decisions were satisfactorily taken, the problem was implementation 
and enforcement in which the elected body was not interested (Ellman and 
Ratnaweera, 1973, pp. 10, 15). There were difficulties over the blurred divi-
sión of responsibilities between the elected body and the government officers 
and "depersonalizing the process of rule enforcement" was needed (ibid., pp. 
8-9, 27). A crucial link is, it seems, between the strategic decisions and those 
who implement them. A degree of impartial independence is required, with 
willingness and ability to carry out instructions earlier arrived at without 
bowing to particularistic local pressures. For this, a bureaucracy loyal to the 
decisions, but with its discipline partly deriving from a larger national or 
regional department, seems the most promising solution. 
Third, allocation and arbitration within communities can usually be left to 
those communities, with perhaps some provisión for appeal and for interven-
tion by the bureaucracy in emergency. If water has to be rationed on a 
rotational basis, the difficulties of allocation within the community irrigation 
tract may be lessened if, as suggested by Le vine et al. (1973, p. 11), the 
intermittent issues of water are large. 
Fourth, there is a persistent need for policing and the prosecution of 
infringements above the community level. These are sometimes carried out by 
communities themselves. Vinayapuram's night guards on its canal where it 
passes through Konaiyur, and the observation of the Dusi-Mamandur presi-
dent (interview, May 1974) that, if government were to be responsible for 
distribution below the tank, it would be continuously necessary to cali in the 
pólice, are reminders of the power of community organization. But it is also 
noteworthy that under Dusi-Mamandur there was ten years of conflict be-
tween two villages, Pallavaram and Kanikillupai, over the height of a weir 
alleged to be diverting too much water to one village to the detriment of the 
other, a dispute which provoked intermittent damage and repair to the offend-
ing structure. Wherever water is scarce, communities resent extraction of 
water from higher up on their own supplies, whether apparently legal, as with 
a rubber company upstream from Wellawaya and with two pumps in the river 
above Vinayagapuram, or evidently illegal, as with the surreptitious raising of 
diversión weirs, the use of pumps at night to lift water from channels, the 
digging or breaching of canal banks, and the like. For these, if not a pólice 
forcé, then something like one is needed. 
Pólice are anyway quite often called in to intervene with both allocation 
and enforcement. During the crisis of water shortage on Kirindi Oya right 
bank in yala 1922, pólice helped with the allocation of water (letter, Di-
visional Engineer SD to the Director of Irrigation, 25 August 1922, Hamban-
tota Kachcheri file E85). In the intervillage conflict in Haryana cited by 
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Vander Velde, "the resulting inter-village acrimony required the intervention 
of the pólice on a major scale to prevent serious violence" (Vander Velde, 
1971, p- 154). In India the Irrigation Commission of 1972 drew attention to 
the need for efficient policing and prosecution and to "the success which has 
been achieved in Haryana through extensive patrolling and inspection of 
canals and channels by flying-squads of officers, adequately armed. These 
flying squads carry out surprise night inspections and whenever offenders are 
caught, heavy penalties are imposed on them. The essence of the system is 
surprise, and prompt and condign punishment. A similar system of inspection 
by flying-squads could be adopted with advantage elsewhere" (MIP, 1972, 
p. 300). A widespread complaint in Sri Lanka was precisely the lack of "prompt 
and condign punishment." Within communities, administrative secretaries 
rarely bothered to file cases which they knew would be subject to long delays; 
and at a bureaucratic level many cases filed by government servants were not 
heard for months, or even years. 
A careful mix of relationships may be best: with user participation in 
strategic decisions and with management by communities of their own water 
supplies once allocated, but with a disciplined organization responsible for 
executing decisions, policing the system, and prosecuting delinquencies. It 
has to be made rational for the staff involved to deny resources to people who 
want them, in particular to issue less water to top-enders than they would like 
to receive. To achieve this the bureaucracy needs, first, high-level political 
support, and second, an internal style and supervisión and incentive system 
which supports and rewards such unpopular actions (Chambers, 1975b and 
1976). 
Comparisons, Theory and Practice 
These various comparisons help toward some theoretical and practical conclu-
sions. 
At the theoretical level, irrigation presents social scientists with tantalizing 
invitations, too rarely taken up, to speculate. Expressions like "irrigation 
society" and "hydraulic organization" hint that there may be strong causal 
links between irrigation systems and technology and social and economic 
relations. Irrigation organization has an appearance of inevitability which 
lends itself to deterministic interpretations. Wittfogel (1957) succumbed to the 
temptations presented by the apparent imperatives of large-scale irrigation, 
requiring, as he saw it, totalitarian organization in order to muster the labor 
forces necessary for the maintenance of hugh flood-control works and irriga-
tion systems. This is not the place to discuss the validity of his thesis. The 
importance of Wittfogel here is that he illustrates the tendency to see the forms 
of irrigation organization as unavoidable, as generated and required by im-
peratives of the physical system and its technology. 
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There are perhaps two main reasons for this tendency. First, on all irriga-
tion systems which are larger than "community" and in which water is 
controlled and allocated by a bureaucracy, that bureaucracy has to be fitted 
geographically to the permanent physical irrigation network. Certain tasks 
have to be carried out and staff are thought to be needed to perform them. 
Second, many statements about irrigation are based on detailed analysis of 
only one example, from which generalizations are extrapolated. The rather 
superficial information gathered in South India and Sri Lanka has provided an 
opportunity to see what variations in organization there may be over a wider 
range of examples than is usually available. 
The outcome is surprising. It presents alternatives to the authoritarian, 
disciplinary, and totalitarian organizations postulated by Wittfogel, and shows 
considerable variance in the discretion of the bureaucracy on major irrigation. 
It is sobering to think how much simpler the conclusions might have been had 
only Sri Lanka's irrigation been considered. As it is, with the corrective of the 
system of community management under Dusi-Mamandur tank in Tamil 
Nadu, there seems nothing inevitable in the Sri Lanka pattern of a bureaucracy 
controlling issues down to the feeder level. The culture in which an irrigation 
system exists appears a major determinant of the form of organization: thus in 
the Sri Lanka examples, where the society is more egalitarian and more 
anarchic, bureaucracy extends farther down the physical system and the case 
for tighter bureaucratic controls seem clear; but in India, where the controls 
already exist in the hierarchical structure of the society, it has not been 
necessary for bureaucracy to extend so far down the system and the need for 
stricter bureaucratic controls is less obvious. 
The technologies used for water acquisition, storage, and distribution, and 
for the maintenance of works, also underly the organization and political 
economy of irrigation. Direct individual appropriation from wells is sensitive 
to technology and an innovation like pump sets can radically differentiate 
access to water in a community and also deplete a communal resource. When 
larger-scale technology is used, there arise multifarious problems of allocation 
and appropriation, some of which have been discussed above. As Wittfogel 
argued, the requirements of construction and maintenance are powerful influ-
ences on social organization. Again, however, the technology used has a 
bearing. Wittfogel assumed that human labor was the main means used to 
build and maintain ancient irrigation works. It is at least possible that this was 
not the case with the ancient tanks of the dry zone of Sri Lanka, and that 
elephants were used as the bulldozers of that day. If so, then the form of 
organization may well have been closer to a modern PWD or military en-
gineering unit than to a totalitarian bureaucracy exacting forced labor from 
peasants. Moreover, with present-day irrigation it is only at the lower levels, 
as at Dusi, Meppathurai, and Vinayagapuram, that communal labor and not 
machinery has to be mustered. 
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At a practical level, both organization and technology are manipulable and 
subject to choice. The objectives of irrigation can be variously stated, but in 
the conditions of South Asia a list might include: 
productivity (of water) 
equity (in its distribution to users) 
stability (in maintaining the water supply over the years) 
continuity (in water use throughout the year) 
carrying capacity (in sustaining population at acceptable levels of living) 
In achieving these objectives, and subject to trade-offs, the prescriptions vary 
by type of irrigation. For bureaucractic-communal and communal irrigation in 
the examples analyzed, the key lies in the reform of organization and 
operation—in short, in improved management of men. For direct-acquisition 
irrigation, the key lies in the design of appropriate technology for the acquisi-
tion process. In both organization and technology we are only at the beginning 
of appreciating the potential. In view of the rapidly increasing pressure of 
population on water supplies—especially in parts of India but elsewhere 
also—exploring and exploiting that potential is a high priority. On the organi-
zational side it requires more and better research, especially by social scien-
tists, combined with and supporting management consultancy and staff train-
ing. On the technological side it requires imaginative and vigorous research 
and development to create technologies appropriate for future rural life. 
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